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In February 2019, Amazon announced a plan to build its new
national headquarters in Queens, New York. The plan would create
between 25,000 and 40,000 well-paid jobs and fill New York City’s tax
coffers with at least $27.5 billion. But Amazon cancelled its decision
in the face of intense political opposition. Perhaps the most vocal
opponent was New York congressional Representative Alexandria
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1 ALEX EDMANS,
AND PROFIT 29 (2020);

GROW THE PIE: HOW GREAT COMPANIES DELIVER BOTH PURPOSE
see J. David Goodman, Amazon Scraps New York Campus, N.Y. TIMES,
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Feb. 15, 2019, at A1.
2 Id. at 29.
3 Id.
4 See, e.g., Colin Mayer, The Future of the Corporation and the Economics of Purpose, 58 J.
MGMT. STUD. 887, 887 (2021) (noting that “[t]he last few years have seen an intensified
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Ocasio-Cortez. She roundly celebrated Amazon’s retreat, tweeting,
“today was the day a group of dedicated, everyday New Yorkers & their
neighbors defeated Amazon’s corporate greed.”1
But the congresswoman’s maligning of Amazon’s relocation was a
sleight of hand. She told her followers that the “tax breaks” that would
have gone to Amazon would instead now be available for public works,
like subway repairs and teacher salaries.2 But this was wrong. The tax
breaks would not be a “donation” of dollars that would have taken
funds away from other public uses; rather, Amazon would have had
some reductions from future tax bills if and only if—the company had
improved the community in financially concrete ways. Yet Amazon was
bullied out of town on these false pretenses, and Queens lost out on
jobs, urban development, and hefty corporate tax payments. 3 Here,
both Amazon and Queens residents lost out—the citizens perhaps the
most.
The tale of Amazon in retreat is one of many hard-hitting
examples Alex Edmans gives in his book, Grow the Pie, all of which
illustrate the growing popular antipathy against corporate profit. In
the most charitable interpretation of Edmans’s examples, people and
politicians increasingly reject capitalism—the private harnessing of
free-economic markets—because they appear to misunderstand the
role that profits play in society. In other cases, however, it seems that
politicians feint ignorance of the social benefits of capitalism in
seeking to hum the most popular tune. Grow the Pie disabuses
misperceptions by providing novel evidence and examples that bust
the myriad myths now perpetuating the growing movement to “cancel
capitalism,” as I’ll call it here.
To be sure, the movement to cancel capitalism is not merely a
political gambit. In one form or another, the notion that corporations’
orientation toward profits, and their embrace of free-market forces, is
morally or legally objectionable has been penned by leading business
and legal scholars over the past few years. Perhaps not surprisingly,
this scholarly antipathy toward capitalism (and its instantiation in
corporate profit-seeking) has become more fervent over the past
eighteen months. Academic, policy, and boardroom conversations
about the merits (and demerits) of capitalism have taken shape in the
“corporate purpose” debate. 4
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But in many scholarly quarters at least, “purpose” has become
synonymous with anti-profit—and some academics advocate for law or
regulation to implement their view. 5 Such academic thinkers urge that
corporations should abandon the pursuit of profit for shareholders (at
least in the first instance) and should instead act first and foremost in
the interests of other stakeholders—employees, customers, suppliers,
or the environment. 6
The ardency of “stakeholder capitalists” stems from a belief that
profit-seeking corporations are responsible for most if not all of
society’s ills. As one prominent stakeholder theorist put it,
[i]t is almost as if business executives somehow believe[] that
“companies should produce addictive products, minimize their
wage bills and costs of employment, pollute the environment, avoid
paying taxes so long as this raises their share price and does not
undermine their share price for reputational or other risk
reasons” . . . . 7

Such sentiment, however, elides profit-seeking in the ordinary course
with legally reprehensible misconduct. It also obscures the reality that
profits are—or at least can be—prosocial and that corporations are
incentivized to create value for shareholders as well as society by
“growing the pie”—in Alex Edmans’s view.
Edmans fully agrees that companies should serve society, as
stakeholders believe. However, unlike stakeholderists who have a
distaste for profit-seeking—and seek to choke off capitalism at its
roots—Edmans painstakingly proves that corporations can pursue
profit while serving social goals. Grow the Pie is, in totality, a tome about
how corporations can multi-task as such, and how they serve society
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debate around the future of the corporation. Underpinning this is a growing concern
around three sets of issues—rising environmental degradation, inequality and mistrust in
business”); see also Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder
Welfare Not Market Value, 2 J. OF L., FIN., & ACCT. 247 (2017); Dorothy S. Lund & Elizabeth
Pollman, The Corporate Governance Machine, 121 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021)
(explaining the “system” of corporate governance, as a matter of various legal and
institutional force, all of which have a shareholder orientation). For a popular piece on
this topic, see Sally Blount & Paul Leinwand, Why Are We Here, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.–Dec.
2019, https://hbr.org/2019/11/why-are-we-here [https://perma.cc/QU2C-CUSB].
5 See, e.g., COLIN MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT: WHY THE CORPORATION IS FAILING US
AND HOW TO RESTORE TRUST IN IT (2013); Rebecca Henderson & George Serafeim,
Tackling Climate Change Requires Organizational Purpose, 110 AM. ECON. ASS’N PAPERS AND
PROC. 177, 177–78 (2020) (“[W]e define corporate purpose as ‘a concrete goal or objective
for the firm that reaches beyond profit maximization’ and define such a purpose as
authentic if the firm routinely makes costly investments in it at the expense of immediate
profitability.”).
6 See Henderson & Serafeim, supra note 5, at 178.
7 Gerald F. Davis, Corporate Purpose Needs Democracy, 58 J. MGMT. STUDS. 902, 905
(2021).
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See KARL R. POPPER, THE POVERTY OF HISTORICISM (1957).
George Soros translated reflexivity to economics in this way. GEORGE SOROS, THE
ALCHEMY OF FINANCE (1987).
10 The data show that people in a post-liberal market world order are, unequivocally,
better off, despite popular perceptions. See, e.g., Max Roser, The Short History of Global Living
Conditions and Why It Matters That We Know It, OUR WORLD IN DATA, (2020), https://
ourworldindata.org/a-history-of-global-living-conditions-in-5-charts
[https://perma.cc
/8KDK-HK3D].
11 Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance (Colum. L. Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory
Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 13-348, 2013) (arguing that markets are legally constructed
and thus to understand market forces we must engage the space between public and
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most effectively and efficiently by pursuing profits. Society reaps
maximum benefit from corporations when those corporations pursue
profit—and do it extremely well. Edmans’s careful analysis would thus
leave capitalism intact in its current form, while pruning for
externalities.
Grow the Pie’s defense of capitalism is a tremendous contribution,
albeit one which Edmans himself downplays. While the author largely
bills his work as one aiming to correct the factual record about profitmaximization—while providing pointers for managers and
policymakers—Edmans reaffirms the validity and viability of corporate
capitalism as an ideology that, in practice, advances human welfare.
Injecting this viewpoint into the academic debate is critically
important at a time when voices of stakeholderists seem the loudest.
Sociological research long ago confirmed that societal expectations (as
often shaped by academic discourse) have real impact on our social
systems and institutions. Popularly, the phenomenon is recognizable
as the “Oedipus effect.” Renowned economist George Soros translated that concept into economics, giving us good reason to think that
what people are told about capitalism from the so-called experts will,
in turn, dictate the shape of our markets and economy for many years
to come. These are not petty stakes. 8 Souring on capitalism prematurely, or based on factual inaccuracy, risks discarding decades of
economic institution building. 9 Between the lines, one could read
Grow the Pie to admonish its readers not to forget that capitalism has
raised standards of living globally and fuels the innovation that enables
human progress. 10
The main goal of this Review is to highlight what I see as Edmans’s
most important contribution in writing Grow the Pie—to explain why
profits are prosocial—and then to expand the connection between his
analysis to law and macroeconomic policy. The Review thus urges that
Grow the Pie provides a compelling foundation for considering why our
existing legal frameworks should support the status quo, as enabling
free-market capitalism, and proposals for radical reform should be
abandoned. 11 Ultimately, and ideally, this Review will draw attention
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to the ways in which Edmans’s data synthesis provides a compelling
defensive of a free-market corporate law landscape, influencing the
trajectory of U.S. corporate law and financial regulatory reform in the
next few years.
I.

THE CORPORATE PURPOSE DEBATE: SHAREHOLDERS,
STAKEHOLDERS, PIE-GROWERS
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private), https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3286&context
=faculty_scholarship [https://perma.cc/ZSP5-HTKN].
12 Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine—The Social Responsibility of Business Is to
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, at SM17. To mark the fiftieth anniversary of
Friedman’s work, University of Chicago economist Luigi Zingales commissioned a series of
essays on the Friedman doctrine, published by the Stigler Center’s ProMarket. To give a full
sense of the current thinking around Friedman and corporate purpose, these essays are
engaged in this Review as much as possible. See, e.g., infra notes 13, 20, 35, 61, and
accompanying text.
13 See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Market Forces Already Address ESG Issues and the Issues Raised
by Stakeholder Capitalism, PROMARKET (Sept. 25, 2020), https://promarket.org/2020/09/25
/market-forces-esg-issues-stakeholder-capitalism-contracts/
[https://perma.cc/S9T7GZ6G].
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In a 1970 opinion piece in the New York Times, Milton Friedman
famously wrote that the “one and only social responsibility of
business . . . [is] to use its resources and engage in activities designed
to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game,
which is to say, engages in open and free competition without
deception or fraud.” 12 The 1970s and 1980s were, of course, the
halcyon days of free markets, with the world still booming from postwar prosperity, deregulation in the wind, and markets seen as the
moral superior to the communism of the Soviet Union.
That sentiment turned, though, after the financial crisis of 2008—
where unbridled markets seemed at the core of markets melting down
and the painful macroeconomic recovery that ensued. Around that
time, capitalism detractors’ voices became louder and stuck in people’s
ears. 13
In the 2010s, stakeholder views become increasingly
prominent, reaching a fever pitch in 2020 in coincidence with the
groundswell of social and political unrest. As discussed above, for
stakeholderists, questioning a corporation’s purpose just meant
decrying its Friedmanesque pursuit of profit.
Edmans appears, in all aspects of the book, motivated to expose a
false paradigm that had become embedded in that corporate purpose
debate—that is, the assumption of a binary choice between
shareholders and stakeholders. Edmans rejects the notion that
corporations must choose “us” (i.e., “executives and shareholders”) or
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“them” (i.e., “workers and customers”), rejecting that shareholder
primacy and stakeholderism are truly odds.14
He does this by offering up an alternative view of a corporation’s
ideal purpose, one that serves both of these (heretofore presumed to
be opposing) groups. The eponymous theory in Grow the Pie, the crux
of which Edmans sets up in Chapter 1, holds that business is not a zerosum game, in which stakeholders lose when shareholders win and vice
versa. The pie metaphor is really quite handy for grasping what should
be an instinctively intuitive concept:
The pie-growing mentality stresses that the pie is not fixed. When all
members of an organisation work together, bound by a common
purpose and focused on the long term, they create shared value in
a way that enlarges the slices of everyone—shareholders, workers,
customers, suppliers, the environment, communities and
taxpayers. 15

EDMANS, supra note 1, at 2.
Id. at 3.
See id. at 35, 49.
See id. at 3, 285.
Id. at 3.

12/21/2021 11:58:47

14
15
16
17
18
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As one can see, the basic notion is that—with intent fixed on
growing value (without creating additional externalities, which layer
comes later,) 16—everyone wins. For those seeped in law and economics, the implication for corporate law and macroeconomic policy is
obvious almost immediately, though Edmans explicates it later. We
should think of the pie as “social value” and “wealth,” and thus a
corporate leader’s responsibility is to maximize that pie (and hence
social welfare), giving one of those slices (profits) to shareholders. 17
There is a big asterisk next to wealth: for Edmans, wealth is not
coterminous with profit; profit is only one slice of the pie in Edmans’s
conceptualization of value maximization.
Subsequent chapters explain why commonly villainized corporate
characters—like CEOs and activist hedge funds—are in fact important,
healthy parts of the welfare-enhancing ecosystem. In summary,
Edmans explains, “[e]vidence suggests that visionary leaders can
transform a company, growing the pie for the benefit of all. Engaged
shareholders can intervene in a failing firm, growing the pie for the
benefit of all.”18
Stakeholders are also critical to the project, as they, too, must be
committed to (and rewarded by) pie growth. As we will see in Part II,
this is a very different story from the one offered up by stakeholder
theory or stakeholder capitalism, which suggests that a company
cannot adequately serve stakeholders’ best interests if it is trying to
maximize profit in its business strategy and operations.
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19 See id. at 20–21.
20 Id. at 87. Former policymakers have echoed a similar sentiment in other forums.
See Mary K. Bush, Shareholder Value and Social Responsibility Are Not at Odds, PROMARKET (Oct.
1, 2020), https://promarket.org/2020/10/01/profit-social-responsibility-not-at-oddsfriedman/ [https://perma.cc/5SPH-BE4B] (noting that business leaders “are signaling to
the executive teams that manage companies that social responsibility, integrated with the
business strategy and practiced smartly, has the potential to create value”).
21 See EDMANS, supra note 1, at 25.
22 See id. at 25–26.
23 See also Anjan Thakor & Robert E. Quinn, Higher Purpose, Incentives and Economic
Performance 4, 37 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Fin. Working Paper No. 706, 2020) (finding
that “organizational higher purpose induces employees to work harder for the same wage
or just as hard for a lower wage . . . firms pursuing higher purpose will elicit higher effort,
and have a lower wage bill”).
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But Edmans sees this “pie-splitting” mentality as unnecessarily
rivalrous. 19 An important point in the book is that companies are
naturally incentivized to serve the interests of stakeholders—that is,
society—because doing so is a necessary precondition to being
profitable. In Edmans words, “[t]o reach the land of profit, follow the
road of [social] purpose.” 20 Throughout the book, Edmans easily
shifts between storytelling and evidence, often weaving the latter into
the former so as to engage a broad audience. Edmans uses this
rhetorical technique to illustrate this basic point that companies that
wish to maximize profit will, naturally, need and want to be socially
responsible in their pursuits.
On that score, Edmans turns to a pharmaceutical anecdote
involving the major pharma company Merck and a terrible disease that
causes blindness by age thirty, colloquially known as “river blindness”
after the geographic communities it most afflicts. 21 Edmans explains
that river blindness affected over eighteen million people in West
Africa and Latin America but, because these populations were poor
and unable to pay for drugs, a pure profit motive for pharmaceutical
companies was never there. But Merck’s then-CEO, Roy Vagelos,
decided to divert company R&D resources to studying the disease. And
when it found a cure, Vagelos decided to give the medicine away for
free. While Vagelos did this for science and society, not only profit, he
was so praised by the business and scientific community for his decision
that the company’s reputation and standing (and hence profit) also
gained a boost. 22
The idea that companies most often do well by doing good, again,
has intuitive appeal. Unhappy or unwell employees will not be as
productive as happy, healthy, balanced ones. 23 So just as a company
should invest in resources to those ends, it should also think more
broadly about the ramifications of its actions—for instance, dumping
filthy water in a river will reduce the health of people in nearby
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Bush, supra note 20.
See EDMANS, supra note 1, at 40.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 3, 84 (quoting Amy Tsao, A Showdown at the Checkout for Costco, BUSINESSWEEK
ONLINE (Aug. 28, 2003), https://search-ebscohost-com.proxy.library.nd.edu/login.aspx
?direct=true&db=bth&AN=10698447&site=ehost-live [https://perma.cc/2YM9-ZLF3]).
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24
25
26
27
28
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communities, including those who work for the company. To prosper,
and satisfy shareholder expectations, management must assemble the
most talented workforce possible. But that cannot happen if some of
the labor pool is left out “because of gender or ethnicity—whether
intentionally or in an unconscious manner.”24
Edmans refers the reader to the example of high-profile
companies like Apple and Costco. He asserts a causal relationship
between investing in stakeholders and generating handsome returns.
Apple, he writes, is “one of the most valuable companies in the
world . . . [b]ecause it serves customers by offering the highest-quality
products . . . nurtures its colleagues . . . invests in long-term supplier
relationships,” while also maintaining a “strong environmental record”
and “contribut[ing] to local communities.” 25 So Apple serves society
and workers, which contributes to its profitability, thereby enriching
shareholders. By the way, Edmans points out, profits do not only line
the pockets of shareholders, they come right back to the public in the
form of tax revenues: consider, “Apple is the largest taxpayer in the
world, remitting over $35 billion to governments between 2015 and
2017. Its effective tax rate was 25% in 2017 and 26% in the previous
four years.” 26 Just think of the socially beneficial things the government can do with those resources, ranging from climate technology to
vaccine development research. Without Apple maximizing profit,
society is certainly worse off.
Costco gives Edmans another facile example to illustrate how
profit maximization can be prosocial, in a slightly different way. Costco
has prioritized its workers. It pays well above the national average for
similar role, gives workers health care before its rivals, and provides all
paid public holidays off (even though those are likely to be big
shopping days). 27 Business commentators were quick to assume that
Costco’s management was “focused on . . . employees to the detriment
of shareholders,” buying into the “us” versus “them” mentality—piesplitting as Edmans calls it multiple times throughout the book.28 But
Costco’s CFO maintained that these investments in workers result in a
more efficient workforce and would thus redouble to the company’s
revenues. Edmans then marshals a wide range of academic studies and
his own empirical analysis to show that, yes, indeed, companies that
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prioritize stakeholders—be they workers or the environment—appear
to have stock prices that beat the market.29
Though this first part of the book (Chapters 1, 2, and 3), Edmans
is not only building his alternative to the shareholder versus
stakeholder paradigm—“grow the pie”—he’s building to a novel
approach to business, what he labels “[p]ieconomics” (stated: “pikeonomics”). 30 To appeal to stakeholderists, pieconomics is framed as
an approach to business that “creat[es] value” for society—but
crucially, it holds tight to profit maximization and focuses on what
managers can do to make their company more “excellent.”31 More
specifically,
[b]eing a responsible business isn’t so much about sacrificing
profits to reduce carbon emissions (splitting the pie differently),
but innovating and being excellent at its core business (growing the
pie) . . . the main way that enterprises fail to serve society is not by
errors of commission (giving too large a slice to leaders or investors),
but by errors of omission (failing to grow the pie by coasting and
sticking to the status quo). 32
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29 See id. at 86–87.
30 Id. at 27.
31 Id. at 28.
32 Id.
33 See, e.g., Fama, supra note 13; see also Edward Rock, For Whom Is the Corporation
Managed in 2020?: The Debate over Corporate Purpose 1, 29 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law
Working Paper No. 515, 2020) (noting that populist pressure on corporate law could have
unintended consequences).
34 Bush, supra note 20.

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 218 Side A

The problem is never that shareholders and executives earn too
much (in salaries or returns), but rather a company that does not
create enough value to go around.
Now, to be clear, Edmans is not a lone voice in the wild in pushing
back against cancel capitalism. There are a few other scholars that
have also questioned the wisdom and workability of stakeholder
capitalism as an alternative to its free-market original.33 Yet even
among this pro-shareholder, pro-capitalism camp there a spectrum.
Some, like former George Bush-era policymaker Mary Bush, urge that
“[t]he core of capitalism—the freedom to engage in entrepreneurial
activities, to trade goods and services, and make profits for
shareholders—in and of itself, is socially responsible.” 34 Moving
further toward a stakeholder view, there are others that subscribe to a
theory of “enlightened shareholder value” (ESV), which proposes
corporations should pursue shareholder wealth with a long-run view of
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making sure that they are responsibly attuned to relevant stakeholder
interests. 35
Edmans’s pieconomics falls somewhere in the middle—unlike
ESV, Edmans would not put profits before social service; but like Bush
and her intellectual companions, he whole-heartedly agrees that
profits are prosocial: “Profits are a key element of a well-functioning
society. Without profits, citizens can’t fund their retirement, insurance
companies can’t pay out claims, and endowments and pension funds
can’t provide for their beneficiaries.”36 Still, until Edmans’s book, the
shareholder camp (with all of its versions) remained at odds with the
stakeholder camp.
Edmans goes a long way to reconciling the two. But in doing so,
whether intentionally or not, Grow the Pie offers a robust defense of a
free-market, capitalist orientation of the corporation. The next Part
suggests that Edmans mounts this subtle defense by busting myths that
have, to date, carried the stakeholder critique of capitalism.
II.

MYTH-BUSTING: WHY PROFIT IS PROSOCIAL AND WHAT THIS
MEANS FOR LAW
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35 See, e.g., David Millon, Enlightened Shareholder Value, Social Responsibility, and the
Redefinition of Corporate Purpose Without Law 1 (Washington & Lee Pub. Legal Stud. Rsch.
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2010-11, 2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=1625750; see also Steven Kaplan, The Enduring Wisdom of Milton Friedman,
PROMARKET (Sept. 14, 2020), https://promarket.org/2020/09/14/the-enduring-wisdomof-milton-friedman/ [https://perma.cc/3AZZ-MLH9] (“It may well be in the long-run
interest of a corporation that is a major employer in a small community to devote resources
to providing amenities to that community or to improving its government. That may make
it easier to attract desirable employees, it may reduce the wage bill or lessen losses from
pilferage and sabotage or have other worthwhile effects.”).
36 See EDMANS, supra note 1, at 58–59.
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By now you should have a good sense of Edmans’s central theory
about pie-growing, how that philosophy can be operationalized with
pieconomics, and how these ideas fit into the broader debate on corporate purpose. Part II of Edmans’s book, like this Review, becomes
more specific about common misunderstandings surrounding the
relationship (and power) of profit in society.
In what follows, I will augment Edmans’s evidence in Chapters 5,
6, and 7, by explaining how these misconceptions have led to legal
frameworks or proposals that are socially suboptimal.
More
specifically, I argue that the analysis in Grow the Pie undermines (at
least) three attempts in corporate law or regulation to orient firms
away from profit—that is, by requiring or urging corporations to adopt
or proclaim their purpose; by exerting negative pressure on executive
compensation; and by stoking fears of activist investing. While legal
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analysis is not the primary aim of Edmans’s work, such conclusions
seem inescapable from his evidence—and I’ll unpack them here.
A. Positive Law on Purpose
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37 WIS. STAT. § 180.0827 (2021).
38 See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); Kelly & Wyndham,
Inc. v. Bell, 266 A.2d 878, 879 (Del. 1970).
39 See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding
of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 767–8 (2015); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the
Idea that For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 155 (2012) (“[T]he
corporate law requires directors, as a matter of their duty of loyalty, to pursue a good faith
strategy to maximize profits for the stockholders.”). But Honorable Leo Strine, no longer
on the bench, has recently changed his outlook a bit. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Restoration: The
Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy,
76 BUS. LAW. 397, 399–400 (2021).
40 See EDMANS, supra note 1, at 52.
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The first of these legal or regulatory reforms bears the most
discussion, as its impact on corporate capitalism stands to be most farreaching. In this general category of legal and policy initiatives, we see
efforts to press companies to publicly commit to stakeholder
capitalism. Among the more significant of this genre of interventions
are constituency statutes. These statutes are written to allow companies to consider a range of stakeholder interests in making their
decisions. A Wisconsin statute provides a good example. It provides
that, in discharging their duties, directors may consider the effect of
their actions on “employees, suppliers and customers of the
corporation,” the “communities in which the corporation operates,”
and “[a]ny other factors that the director or officer considers
pertinent.” 37
This kind of statutory language may seem trivial, but it has
potential to be a powerful weapon for stakeholderists seeking to undo
profit-seeking. Longstanding corporate law doctrine assumes—
implicitly or explicitly—the Friedman doctrine by equating fiduciary
duties of managers and boards with a responsibility to act in
shareholders’ best interests. 38 This, in turn, became the standard
against which board members’ duties of loyalty and care were
measured. 39
While constituency statutes merely grant permission for boards of
directors and managers to consider stakeholder interests 40 (they do
not require it), in effect, they open the door to popular pressure on
boards and executives to cater to many different groups, even if to the
detriment of shareholders. In essence, then, these statutes act as
legislative overrides to judge-made corporate law that, for over one
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hundred years, had specified the content of fiduciary duties with
reference to the shareholders.
Still, such legislative endorsement of the stakeholder capitalist
idea is not enough for some academics.41 And while the British
Academy has proposed reforms to the U.K. Companies Act that would
require corporations to “state their purposes” 42—going a long way to
naming and shaming those that could not do so satisfactorily—former
dean of Oxford’s Saïd Business School, Professor Colin Mayer, has
urged that firmer mandates are required.43
In some cases, regulatory moves have mimicked the legislative
ones described above. The stock exchange NASDAQ—a quasiregulatory body—has adopted a new requirement that companies
disclose diversity statistics regarding their boards of directors. 44 These
rules mandate companies have at least two diverse board members—
one that is female and one that is a minority or LGBTQ—or explain
why they do not. 45 NASDAQ is partaking in the purpose conversation
on the side of stakeholders. In the main, NASDAQ’s purpose is—
literally—to facilitate market exchange. But this new rule is a selfdescribed move to align NASDAQ’s corporate members’ “purpose”
with its own: “to champion inclusive growth and prosperity to power
stronger economies.”46 In similar fashion, the SEC is inching toward
requiring greater ESG disclosures to generally address the “global”
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41 See, e.g., Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, A Statutory Model for Corporate
Constituency Concerns, 49 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1119 (2000) (“Only a mandatory constituency
statute ensures consideration of the interests of all stakeholders by directors. Opt-in statutes
bind directors only if the shareholders invoke coverage of the statute. . . . [I]t is difficult to
envision shareholders willingly subordinating the priority of their interests in corporate
decisionmaking.”). But see Jill E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Should Corporations Have
a Purpose?, 99 TEX. L. REV. 1309, 1328 (2021) (questioning whether constituency statutes
really do much to enforce corporate purpose in any significant way).
42 THE BRITISH ACADEMY, PRINCIPLES FOR PURPOSEFUL BUSINESS 20–21 (2019),
https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/documents/224/future-of-the-corporationprinciples-purposeful-business.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Z4G-YUU2].
43 Mayer, supra note 4; see also Davis, supra note 7, at 902 (urging reform beyond what
the British Academy has suggested and in favor of “more effective state regulation from
above”).
44 Alexander Osipovich, Nasdaq’s Board-Diversity Proposal Wins SEC Approval, WALL ST.
J. (Aug. 6, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/nasdaqs-board-diversity-proposal-faces-secdecision-11628242202 [https://perma.cc/KCU9-PN7C].
45 Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Adopt Listing Rules Related to Board
Diversity, 85 Fed. Reg. 80472, 80472 (proposed Dec. 11, 2020).
46 Nasdaq to Advance Diversity Through New Proposed Listing Requirements, NASDAQ (Dec.
1, 2020), https://www.nasdaq.com/press-release/nasdaq-to-advance-diversity-throughnew-proposed-listing-requirements-2020-12-01
[https://perma.cc/7AYG-ZLMG]
(statement of Nasdaq CEO).
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nature of ESG issues. 47 Board diversity is an unalloyed good—but
using disclosure to force the issue would be an unprecedented state
intervention in the boardroom.
Overall, these experiments in using positive law to force purpose
may implicitly drive companies to be ashamed of, or to abandon, their
pursuit of profits. To the extent these laws and regulations question
the morality of profit-seeking, and thus deter it, there are likely to be
social costs and unintended consequences. Edmans’s evidence makes
this clear.
1. Stifled Innovation
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47 John Coates, ESG Disclosure—Keeping Pace with Developments Affecting Investors, Public
Companies and the Capital Markets, SEC (Mar. 11, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/publicstatement/coates-esg-disclosure-keeping-pace-031121?utm_medium=email&utm_source
=govdelivery [https://perma.cc/9X9H-8BPW] (urging that, going forward, “SEC policy on
ESG disclosures will need to be both adaptive and innovative”); see also Paul G. Mahoney &
Julia D. Mahoney, The New Separation of Ownership and Control: Institutional Investors and ESG,
2 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 840 (expressing concerns of the use of disclosure law to advance
political or social issues).
48 See EDMANS, supra note 1, at 3, 16, 29, 36, 40, 46, 70, 101, 116, 130, 138, 144, 164,
189, 196, 201, 211, 217, 224, 238, 251, 253, 309.
49 Id. at 47–48.
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For one, using law or regulation to create distance between
companies and profit-seeking is likely to stymie welfare-enhancing
innovations. A central theme throughout Edmans’s book is that profit
is not profligate; rather, it is the engine oil for the human wheel of
progress. Edmans refers to the social benefits of corporate innovation
no less than eighty-four times throughout the book, with numerous
examples illustrating a virtuous chain: profit incentivizes experimentation, which leads to break-through technologies, medicines, or
consumer services, ultimately enhancing human welfare. 48 Indeed,
that capitalism and the corporation are at the heart of human progress
seems difficult to deny—simply ask yourself to name a great civilization
that was created by a stakeholder-oriented society (or, put differently,
that did not look favorably on free markets, industry, and trade).
In some ways, I would go further than Edmans here. At times, he
may be overly sanguine in presuming that companies are inspired to
innovate for innovation’s sake irrespective of profit potential.49 It
seems more like the exception than the rule: companies might be
willing to subsidize research in the hopes of the rare breakthrough—
but profit is always part of the equation. So, Edmans is correct that
corporate innovation is socially beneficial, but may well underestimate
(at least in certain parts) the extent to which profit is the motivational
spark, in one way or another. But overall, Edmans’s general point is
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quite well taken: the realization that we need successful companies that
are focused on innovation should put the brakes on stakeholder
capitalists’ moves to hamstring corporate profit. After all, forcing
companies to forgo profits is likely to translate directly and in the first
instance to the R&D line item in the corporate budget.
2. Janus-Faced Corporations
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50 Id. at 31.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 293.
53 Net present value, or “NPV,” is a standard financial model for deciding whether a
company should pursue a particular project consistent with its costs and likely revenue
stream. In its purest sense, it does not incorporate value that would accrue to stakeholders.
54 See EDMANS, supra note 1, at 66.
55 Id. at 68.

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 220 Side B

Additionally, these efforts to cajole firms into adopting purpose in
a public and showy way risks diluting corporate resources and diverting
their attention, disserving shareholders and stakeholders alike. While
Edmans consistently maintains that pie-growing is socially responsible,
at no point does he endorse sacrifice or ambivalence toward profit. He
is quite concrete about what purpose means. “[I]t doesn’t imply
unfettered pursuit of societal goals, [while] cheerfully ignoring
profits.” 50 After all, Edmans reasons, “[i]f a company delivers value to
stakeholders entirely as a result of sacrificing profits, this splits the pie
differently rather than growing it.”51 The pursuit of a social purpose
cannot be, so Edmans urges, “undisciplined.”52
To guide restraint, Edmans grounds his vision of corporate
“purpose” in economic theory. Unlike other stakeholder theorists,
Edmans offers up a concrete framework for deciding when a company
should pursue a project that might have long-term social value but has
a “net present value” that is difficult to calculate. 53 Edmans creates a
three-prong test: first, he asks, is there a question of multiplication.
That is an estimate of the benefit to all stakeholders from a particular
investment. Apple might spend $500 on a gym membership for its
employees, but if the best quality local gym costs $100, Apple would
more effectively and efficiently use its resources to pay higher wages to
employees. 54
If the multiplication test is satisfied, Edmans would next ask
whether comparative advantage is present. Surely, Apple has the
ability to feed the homeless. But if a soup kitchen can make $1 go
further than Apple can, because it has better skill, infrastructure, and
food supplier relations, then Apple would more effectively and
efficiently donate money to the soup kitchen rather than replicate its
services. 55 The notion of comparative advantage and specialization was
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also central to Friedman’s resistance to pressing corporations into all
manners of social service. As he noted, corporate executives are ill
prepared for solving social problems.56 They were hired for the
expertise on their given industry and management, not for solving
social failures. 57 For example, a CEO has no expertise in making
calculated decisions to solve inflation or unemployment. 58
The third prong of the test considers materiality. Are stakeholders that would be benefited by any given corporate effort material to
the company? 59 This might seem cool and calculating, but in a world
of finite resources, Edmans must be right that there should be some
ordering of priority and judgment in the allocation of how resources
will be used. Investments that improve the welfare of employees will
inure to the benefit of the company, and ultimately grow the pie for
all. But investing in the working conditions of a foreign firm, for
instance, will have an impact on the pie that is difficult to discern—if
at all. Resources would be better concentrated on stakeholders who
are material to the firm who are thus likely to be value-growers.
This framework, and its eminent sensibility, helps us see that a
Janus-faced corporation is not good for society, as appealing as grand
statements of corporate purpose might seem. 60 Companies should be
responsible, yes of course, but within limits that conform with
economic logic. When companies deliver profit alongside purpose,
their social impact can be large. Not only will they benefit the direct
targets of the project (i.e., material stakeholders) but, in growing value
of shareholders in their course, they also increase the resources those
shareholders have to reinvest in whatever social causes those
shareholders consider most important. 61
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56 See Friedman, supra note 12.
57 See id.
58 See id.
59 See EDMANS, supra note 1, at 70–71.
60 With mixed reception, the Business Roundtable—a group of CEOs of America’s
leading corporations—adopted what appears to be a stakeholder philosophy in an August
2019 statement of corporate governance. Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a
Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy that Serves All Americans,’ BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19,
2019), https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purposeof-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans
[https://perma.cc
/ML62-JS4Q]. See Lucian Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, Opinion, ‘Stakeholder’ Capitalism
Seems Mostly for Show, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2020, at A15.
61 Indeed, precisely as Friedman pointed out, profit maximization ensures that
individuals have “maximum flexibility to choose which social responsibilities they wish to
fulfill.” Alex Edmans, What Stakeholder Capitalism Can Learn from Milton Friedman,
PROMARKET (Sept. 10, 2020), https://promarket.org/2020/09/10/what-stakeholdercapitalism-can-learn-from-milton-friedman/ [https://perma.cc/6KMQ-VJMH].
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3. Statist Corporate Law

B. CEOs and Activists
The above section discussed how law has tried to force, directly or
indirectly, companies away from profit maximization through purpose
statements or disclosures. The law has also targeted the actors that
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62 Bush, supra note 20.
63 Kaplan, supra note 35.
64 Nicholas Kristof, This Has Been the Best Year Ever, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/opinion/sunday/2019-best-year-poverty.html
[https://perma.cc/73FK-37DL].
65 Kaplan, supra note 35.
66 Id.
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Finally, corporate leaders are not elected officials. Edmans
reminds us that conflating a corporation’s public role with a political
one is undemocratic. Requiring that companies have some purpose
throws up difficult questions that nettle rule of law. Who decides which
purposes are legitimate; or more intrusive yet, what those purposes
should be? When the State decides the answers to those questions, the
foundations of the private markets become seriously under siege.
On the flip side, to the extent corporations are given power to
decide and define which causes are socially meritorious—or which are
not—other problems will emerge. For example, if companies raise
prices to further mandatory social goals, they could well be seen to
enter the dispiriting business of taxation without representation—as
Friedman himself forewarned.
The social ills that follow state direction or control of productive
assets may be easy for the current generation of scholars and
policymakers to ignore. But for those that lived and enacted policy
during an earlier era, it was clear to them “that economic growth and
prosperity were stunted by government ownership of productive assets,
restrictions on capital movement and business formation, and high
business taxes.”62
The world with capitalism, and companies that seek profit, is
much brighter. As Nicholas Kristof pointed out in a New York Times oped, “the result of corporate shareholder value maximization mixed in
with globalization” 63 is that, “[f]or humanity over all, life just keeps
getting better.”64 In a world of free markets, “[p]eople living in
extreme poverty fell from 42 percent of the world’s population in 1981
to below 10 percent today. That is 2 billion people who are no longer
suffering extreme poverty. Absolute poverty declined substantially in
the US, from 13 percent in 1980 to 3 percent today.”65
“And this is more or less what Friedman predicted.” 66
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67 EDMANS, supra note 1, at 103.
68 Thomas Clarke, The Contest on Corporate Purpose: Why Lynn Stout was Right and Milton
Friedman was Wrong, 10 ACCT. ECON. & L. 1, 24 (2020).
69 The Dodd-Frank Act required the SEC to adopt rules that limit incentive
compensation in public companies, but those reforms have yet to be adopted. Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, § 956, 124 Stat. 1376,
1842 (2010).
70 See EDMANS, supra note 1, at 102–03.
71 Id. at 100–01.
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exert pressure on companies, internally and externally, to ensure they
are maximizing value by maximizing profits—corporate CEOs and
activist investors, respectively.
The CEO has become a much-maligned figure in society of late,
the target of political and academic opprobrium. Edmans collects
political statements to this effect, ranging from Hillary Clinton’s
campaign statement that “[t]here’s something wrong when the
average American CEO makes 300 times more than the typical
American worker,” to Donald Trump referring to CEO pay as “a total
and complete joke.” 67 Academics pile on with a view that “CEOs can
be self-serving arbiters of social value and would, if given the
opportunity, divert resources to their own enrichment under the guise
of ‘purpose.’” 68 This sentiment has taken legal form as efforts to
reduce and constrain executive compensation. Europe has created
firm limits on executive compensation in big banks, and the U.S.
endlessly debates how to curb executive compensation.69
Edmans spends some length bringing the folly of this antipathy
into sharp relief with the story of how Bart Becht was run out of his
company, Reckitt, in 2010, by the public scorn that followed disclosure
of his £92 million salary. 70 The media excoriated him for earning such
a high figure—the absolute dollar amount seemed gross compared to
the rest of U.K. citizens.
But like Amazon’s forced retreat, both shareholders and society
lost out from Becht’s departure. He had been an excellent CEO.
Becht had “lived and breathed” his cleaning product company,
rubbed elbows with shoppers, tested out the products in his own home,
and constantly sought to design new household products that would
make everyday citizens’ lives a bit easier. Becht was the quintessential
pie-grower—he grew his company’s shares from seven to thirty-six
pounds since a 1999 merger and won The Economist’s innovation award
in 2009 for creating power brands that could accomplish multiple
cleaning feats at once. By all accounts, he encouraged creativity
among his workers—giving them fulfillment and autonomy—tolerated
failure as the cost of experimentation, and encouraged skill
development by all ranks of workers. 71 In Edmans’s ledger, Becht
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leaving Reckitt was a loss, a byproduct of a mistaken conflation
between fairness and equity. (Later in the book, Edmans returns to
this myth that equality always means fairness, using game theory to
illustrate how obsession with equality can lead to preferences that
“shrink[] the pie,” all the way to zero, in dogmatic effort to stop some
from getting more than others.) 72
Activist investors—like hedge and private equity funds—are
equally disliked by many corporate law reformers. Infamously labeled
“Barbarians at the Gate,” 73 activist investors are seen as corporate
raiders that invade companies to extract their value and leave skeletons
in their wake. For years, academics have criticized activists in this way,
decrying their short-termism as antithetical to the stakeholder cause
célèbre. 74 And again, law and regulation follows popular expectations
and beliefs. Recent SEC rules may have made it more difficult for
activist investors to press for changes in corporate strategy,75 while
policymakers and regulators persistently eye private hedge and equity
funds in an effort to hold them back from increasing their
interventions. 76
Like the villain CEO, Edmans casts this perception of activist
investors off as myth. He argues that activists are good stewards because their singular goal is pie-growth. To put it very simply, Edmans’s
research “demonstrate[s] that large investors, also known as
blockholders, have the incentive to look beyond earnings and invest
the time and resources necessary to truly understand an enterprise.”77
Activists provide the ideal balance of patient capital—capital
committed for the long-term that can tolerate a company’s ups and
downs and see it through distress 78—and nimble capital—investors

72
73
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Id. at 301.
BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR
NABISCO (2008).
74 See, e.g., Mark R. DesJardine & Rodolphe Durand, Disentangling the Effects of Hedge
Fund Activism on Firm Financial and Social Performance, 41 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1054 (2020).
But see Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund
Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085 (2015).
75 See Brokaw Act, S. 1744, 115th Cong. (2017); see also Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts
Rule Amendments to Provide Investors Using Proxy Voting Advice More Transparent,
Accurate and Complete Information (July 22, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2020-161 [https://perma.cc/XZ4P-KQHT].
76 See, e.g., Stop Wall Street Looting Act, S. 2155, 116th Cong. (2019); James A. Keyte
& Kenneth B. Schwartz, Private Equity and Antitrust: A New Landscape, ANTITRUST, Fall 2016,
at 21.
77 See EDMANS, supra note 1, at 160.
78 See Christina Parajon Skinner, Nonbank Credit, 9 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 149 (2019)
(discussing the economic benefits of credit supplied by private debt and credit funds).
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that credibly threaten “exit” if the company’s board and managers are
resistant to get on the pie-growing train.79
Edmans’s chapters on CEOs and activist investors, taken in
context with the whole book, underscore that these players are crucial
in the pie-growing ecosystem. CEOs and activists are key corporate
norm-influencers; they have outsized influence on the company’s
direction with their ability to shape a corporate culture toward
innovation and enthusiasm—which, as we have learned, is necessary to
ultimately grow the pie.
Overall, even though Edmans’s focus is not on law, his book is a
powerful indictment of each of the legal frameworks and reforms
discussed above, as economically distortionary. The implication is
subtle but significant—policy is and would be wrongheaded to try to
quash capitalism and profit-seeking. Though Edmans claims to play
nice with stakeholders, in truth, Grow the Pie reads as more aligned with
the Professor Eugene Fama’s “preference to let competition produce
adaptations, rather than impose top-down changes with catchy names
like stakeholder capitalism that are likely rife with unintended
consequences.”80
But that does not mean law is irrelevant to financial markets and
corporate action. The question of what role law and regulation can
play to facilitate pie-growing, without distortions, is the subject of Part
III.
III.

WHAT ROLE FOR LAW IN PIE-GROWING?

If environmental and social goals enter consumer utility functions,
they provide incentives for firms to provide products that lean
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79 EDMANS, supra note 1, at 141, 158; Eleonora Broccardo, Oliver Hart & Luigi
Zingales, Exit vs. Voice 2 (Aug. 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Scholars at
Harvard at https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/hart/files/exit_vs_voice_08-13-2020.pdf); see
also George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate
Governance, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1073, 1079 (1995) (applying the concepts of exit and voice to
lender actions to promote corporate governance). The concepts of exit, voice, and loyalty
come from Albert Hirschman, ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970).
80 Fama, supra note 13.
81 See Sarah E. Light & Christina P. Skinner, Banks and Climate Governance, 122 COLUM.
L. REV. 1895 (2021).

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 223 Side A

In parts, Grow the Pie could be read to endorse, albeit implicitly, a
view that markets will often reach a socially beneficial equilibrium
without legal or regulatory interventions. One may well look at the
proliferation of ESG funds and banks’ efforts to press borrowers to
reach net zero as evidence of prosocial market forces, in parallel to
Edmans’s book. 81 In the abstract, we can think of this free-market
Nirvana as a perfect Coasian bargain:
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toward these goals. For example, if many consumers prefer the
more expensive meat of free-range chickens and cows to the meat
of their caged brethren, firms will provide free-range meat without
Government incentives. 82
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82 Fama, supra note 13; see also Dorothy S. Lund, Corporate Finance for Social Good, 121
COLUM. L. REV. 1617, 1658 (2021) (noting that “whenever stakeholders value the effects of
a corporate decision more than its cost, there exists a possible Coasian bargain between the
corporation and the stakeholders that would maximize overall welfare”).
83 Edmans also envisions quite a significant role for government. EDMANS, supra note
1, at 259–68. The most important is taxing externalities. Central to pieconomics is the idea
that actions that a company takes to affect society (e.g., treating employees well, polluting
the environment) ultimately are internalized and affect profits. However, this is only the
case if externalities are internalized through taxes.
84 In similar spirit, tax and corporate scholars might work together to think of other
creative ways to incentivize the kind of innovative pie-growing efforts that are the core of
pieconomics.

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 223 Side B

But what Edmans more likely favors is law that facilitates pieconomics
while providing guardrails against abuse. The balance of this Review
will take each role for law in turn.
Much of the work done in the later chapters of Grow the Pie is
focused on how pieconomics can work in practice; that is, how it can
be operationalized on the ground. While these chapters focus almost
entirely on what companies, citizens and investors can do, there is
more to be said about law. 83 Consider a few examples, not fully
exhausted here. First, the SEC might consider allowing a bit more
experimentation with disclosure. There are serious consequences for
material misstatements in reporting, leaving companies little room to
try new methods of financial calculations and disclosures.
To the extent the limits of traditional corporate finance analyses
inhibit firms from demonstrating to the public how they reap value
from longer-term stakeholder investments, it may well be time to
develop alternatives (or supplements) to traditional forms of financial
accounting and valuation, and to make those experiments public. To
the extent companies become more confident disclosing more data
and financials about their social efforts, and their impact on firm
profits, companies might come to compete along this new purposeful
dimension. Accordingly, regulatory safe harbors from mistakes, where
valuation experimentation is concerned, could be socially beneficial. 84
It may also be the case that law can do more by doing less—getting
out of the way of markets and backing down to allow the growth of
pieconomics. But without its ability to provide guardrails, any form of
capitalism—including pieconomics—is likely bound to fail for lack of
social trust.
All too often, profit is confused with corruption, abuse, illegality,
or poor ethics. And equating bad behavior with corporate action
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85 See EDMANS, supra note 1, at 3, 16–19, 22–23, 87.
86 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1842 (2010).
87 Id. § 1011.
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makes capitalism an easy target. Indeed, one arguable weakness of the
book is the extent to which it blurs (at times) this distinction. In early
pages, for example, Edmans offers various stories of corporations
“exploit[ing]” society, “price-gouging,” “pushing products that
customers don’t need,” manipulating the price of critical
pharmaceuticals, or lying about emissions;85 but this is not capitalism,
it is misconduct—if not formally illegal behavior, it is certainly
unethical.
Where conduct is objectively unlawful, there are a host of new
additions to the regulatory landscape that make it easier to detect,
deter, and punish corporate misdeeds. As just a few examples, the
Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 created a whistleblower program housed
within the SEC, that provides cash incentives for those with inside
knowledge of securities violation to come forward with a tip. 86 That
same Act also created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to
ferret out abuse and misrepresentation of consumer financial
products. 87 Just a decade old, these post-2008 crisis reforms are still in
the fine-tuning stage but hold potential to curb corporate misdeeds.
Lastly, soft law frameworks often associated with legal theory and
training can be imported into business settings to help guide corporate
culture. Inasmuch as pieconomics requires managers to perform a
new-age role—pursuing profits with a purpose—with agility and grace,
they may require some intellectual support in thinking through
corporate purpose. Legal ethics may have some role to play in
answering a first-order question: how (and where) do corporate
managers develop the intellectual foundations for grappling with these
thorny questions of corporate purpose, and where do they get
practice?
Business schools’ partnerships with law and ethics research could
be central to this project. Concretely, these are three areas where
lawyers—and legal scholars—have a good deal to contribute to
pieconomics.
Professionalism. Developing a sense of professionalism via business
ethics classes seems central to the mission of training managers to
reflect on corporate purpose. Professionalism, after all, implies a
relationship defined by duty. In other fields, like law, graduate school
training includes efforts to develop a professional ethos of integrity,
which instills the legal professional with some commitment to a
broader set of principles—including, for example, social justice,
fairness, honestly, and equity. This sense of professionalism is instilled
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through codes (that establish principles of conduct), 88 conversation in
the classroom, and consistent reaffirmation by professors that
professionalism includes responsibility to clients and to society.
There are a few ways to develop professionalism in the classroom.
The first step is likely something of an intellectual exercise, to facilitate
student-led discussions about the meaning of “professionalism” in
business—which is “not generally thought of as comprising a single or
traditional profession.” 89 To make such conversations more concrete,
students should exchange ideas on desired outcomes of
professionalism—often, professionalism “was seen as strengthening
both the trustworthiness of the sector and the sense of pride and
purpose among those working in it”; 90 what does this mean for U.S.
business and what impact on corporate purpose in the 2020s?
Legal scholars can helpfully discuss business professionalism in
the literature as rooted around corporate culture. 91 A corporation’s
culture reflects the norms of doing business and interacting with
stakeholders (including shareholders) both inside and outside of a
firm. A firm’s culture is now thought to be responsible for individual
conduct and a byproduct of its professionalism. 92 “Culture” in
Edmans’s view, “is critical to ensure that a purpose permeates
throughout the company.” 93
Practice. Can practice make purpose? I think so. Business schools
are, of course, practice based; many use cases as the dominant (if not
exclusive) pedagogical tool for training future corporate leaders. But
there is no established method for practicing corporate ethics—at least
not in the sense discussed here, where ethics is an entryway for
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88 Though beyond the scope of this paper, a related issue for students to explore is
the disconnect between corporate codes and corporate practice. See, e.g., Charles Michael,
Judge Wood: “Puffery” in Papa John’s Code of Ethics Cannot Support Securities Fraud Claims, SDNY
BLOG (Feb. 4, 2021), https://www.sdnyblog.com/judge-wood-puffery-in-papa-johns-codeof-ethics-cannot-support-securities-fraud-claims/ [https://perma.cc/5BFJ-QAMX]; Eur.
Corporate Governance Inst., Are Corporate Purpose Statements “Verbiage”?, YOUTUBE (Dec. 31,
2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SpobSTZmxV8 [https://perma.cc/Z2ULC4S9].
89 BANKING STANDARDS BD., ANNUAL REVIEW 2017/2018 65 (2018), https://
bankingstandardsboard.org.uk/annual-review-2017-2018/professionalism/.
90 Id.
91 There is a years-long conversation, started shortly after the global financial crisis of
2008, about ethics and culture in global banking. See, e.g., Christina Parajon Skinner,
Misconduct Risk, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1559 (2016).
92 “The best view finance as a profession with a purpose to serve their clients. They
see themselves as custodians of their institutions, with a sense of responsibility for the
system.” Mark Carney, Governor, Bank of Eng., Remarks at the Bank Standards Board
Panel “Worthy of Trust? Law, Ethics and Culture in Banking” (Mar. 21, 2017), https://
www.bis.org/review/r170322d.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6YY-PRBB].
93 EDMANS, supra note 1, at 211.

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 225 Side A

12/21/2021 11:58:47

1'/B6.,11(5BB'2&; '2127'(/(7( 

2021]

30

CANCELLING CAPITALISM?

439

developing a layered sense of corporate duty. Engaging students in
simulated ethical dilemmas again seems central to the project of
making corporate purpose seem concrete, precisely because purpose
is not static. Just as Friedman noted,
a corporate executive is an employe [sic] of the owners of the
business. He has direct responsibility to his employers. That
responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance with their
desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible
while conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in
law and those embodied in ethical custom. 94
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94 Friedman, supra note 12 (emphasis added).
95 See Governance & Cultural Reform, FED. RSRV. BANK OF N.Y., https://
www.newyorkfed.org/governance-and-culture-reform [https://perma.cc/5NAM-C62Z].
96 Education and Industry Forum on Financial Services Culture, FED. RSRV. BANK OF N.Y.,
https://www.newyorkfed.org/eif [https://perma.cc/SDV3-PB64].
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Recent work produced by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(the “New York Fed”) has taken up this challenge of providing
practical ethical simulation to the MBA classroom, at least for banks.95
As part of that work, the New York Fed has constituted the “Education
and Industry Forum,” a group with external members from business
and academia charged with, among other things, developing case
studies around ethics and culture for use in business school
classrooms. 96 That group has published cases on a range of ethically
grey areas ranging from (possible) sexual harassment and technology
misuse, to market manipulation and implicit bias.
The impetus behind the development of these case studies was to
allow students to experience an ethical dilemma before actually
encountering such challenges in the workplace, at which point
decisionmaking becomes stressed by pressures of time, hierarchy, and
collegiality. Instead, by tackling ethical thickets in case studies at
school, students can “practice” developing the skills required to
recognize ethically grey areas in the first place, and start to build their
toolkit for handling such challenges in ways that are beneficial for the
firm’s stated long-term values. The case study approach that has been
adopted by the Education and Industry Forum on Financial Services
Culture (EIF) is a model worth replicating more broadly, to explore
issues of corporate responsibility and purpose in the classroom as part
of the business school ethics education.
Polarization (less of it). Finally, educators would do well to remind
themselves that the job of a professor is to facilitate the exchange of
ideas and expose students to wide-ranging perspectives. Like all other
areas of academic learning, where the purpose of the corporation is
concerned, students will be best served by instructors who are intent
on depolarizing the debate. Polarization of the debate—with share
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holder interests on one end and stakeholder interests on the other—
does a disservice to students who believe they must pledge their loyalty
to one camp or another. In reality, shareholder and stakeholders are
just two sides of one coin. These future corporate managers must be
taught that neither extreme is workable.
If one reflects carefully on what Milton Friedman said, it would be
plain that Friedman rejected an us versus them paradigm, too.
Though committing the corporation to pursue profits, he provided:
[I]t may well be in the long-run interest of a corporation that is a
major employer in a small community to devote resources to
providing amenities to that community or to improving its
government. That may make it easier to attract desirable employes
[sic], it may reduce the wage bill or lessen losses from pilferage and
sabotage or have other worthwhile effects. 97

In earnest, the two poles are perhaps not so far apart. Rather than
focusing on the differences, business and legal education might do
best for society by harnessing students’ current passion for corporate
purpose in order to transcend a binary conversation—in the interest
of maximizing wealth, happiness, and utility for all. In Edmans’s
words, let us focus on teaching students how to grow the pie for
everyone rather than how to split it up.
CONCLUSION
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In Grow the Pie, Professor Alex Edmans takes his readers on a
journey through corporate America, relishing us with anecdotes about
the virtues and potential of corporate capitalism that are now all-toooften forgotten or ignored. Edmans reminds his readers that
capitalism is the soil for innovation that increases human welfare,
serving everyone involved (shareholders and stakeholder alike). While
recognizing the need for outer limits to corporate action, Edmans
offers a theory of pieconomics that is loyal to capitalism’s core. He
pushes companies to drive for better, not worse, to the benefit of all
society. This Review has layered some legal analysis and implications
on top of Edmans’s finance and management account, with some hope
of bridging these disciplines in the ongoing conversation about
corporate purpose and capitalism of today.

Friedman, supra note 12.
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